It might not always feel like it, but there is money in the thriller writing business….eventually. The TV channel Alibi has put together a list of the highest-earning crime and thriller writers, on both sides of the Atlantic. Ian Fleming is top of the British list, with earnings of a £100 million-plus, followed by Agatha Christie, and then by Jeffrey Archer (although I don’t think of him as a thriller writer).
Over in the US, it is headed by John Grisham on an extraordinary $600 million, followed by Dan Brown on $400 million – although I reckon if work it out per book, Brown has done better.
Are there any lessons in this for the rest of us writers? Two, I think. The first is that it takes a long time. All the writers on both lists have been writing for a long time – even Dan Brown published his first book in 1998 and it was a while before he had any success.
The second is that you have to write a lot. All the writers on the list are prolific, knocking out book after book. There are no one-hit wonders.
Anyway, I guess the moral is to keep plugging away. Riches await….although hopefully not after I’m dead.
Sunday, 1 May 2011
Monday, 25 April 2011
To Be A Better Trader, Try Being Happier.
In my Money Week column this week, I'm looking at how you can become a better trader - just by being happier. Here's a taster.
What makes a successful trader or fund manager? An all-encompassing view of how the global economy is developing? An instinct for a bargain? A fleetness of foot, and the confidence to take bold positions? A willingness to ignore the herd, and buy the stuff everyone else is selling? Or the patience and perseverance of a tortoise?
They are all perfectly reasonable suggestions, and there are many great traders and investors who have made fortunes through one or other of qualities.
But actually the answer may be a lot simpler.
Just try being a bit happier.
According to research released this month by the French business school Insead, the happier people are, the better they are at predicting the future – and the more depressed they are, the worse they are.
The implication is clear, both for banks and fund managers. Just make sure your traders and stock-pickers are cheerful and positive, and their performance will improve. The trouble is, however, they are caught in a classic Catch-22. Everything about the way most people in the financial markets work is guaranteed to make them miserable – and therefore to make them worse at their jobs.
The Insead research provided a fascinating insight into what makes people good at predicting future events – and what makes them bad at it as well. It has long been noted that more cheerful people tend to have a more optimistic view of the future, whilst the more miserable, not very surprisingly, are usually more pessimistic. In the markets, the optimists are usually bulls, while the pessimists are bears.
The Insead study went a lot deeper than that. It took 1,100 people, and asked them to predict the results of games during the 2010 World Cup. They weren’t particularly being optimistic or pessimistic – they weren’t making predictions for their own nations - they were just forecasting what was likely to happen. As an incentive to try and get it right, there was a cash prize for getting it right.
Interestingly, the more depressed the people were, the less likely they were to make accurate predictions. Indeed, many of the most down in the dumps did worse than they would have done just by picking winners from a hat. And they were significantly more likely to make ridiculous predictions, such as forecasting that North Korea would win the whole tournament.
The Insead team is now taking the same methods, and applying then directly to the emotional states of stock and commodity traders. But the implications are already clear enough. If being happy or depressed has a bearing on your ability to forecast the outcome of events, then it follows that happier fund managers or traders will be better at their jobs than their more morose colleagues.
The snag is, how do you influence the happiness of your staff?
Well, in truth, it isn’t that hard.
We have a fairly good understanding of what makes people feel good about life, and what make them depressed. Most of the key points were summarised by the ‘Action for Happiness’ campaign launched earlier this month by Professor Richard Layard, the guru of happiness economics, among others.
Happiness, it turns out, comes down to a few fairly simple things. Do things for other people. Take care of your body. Notice the world around you. Keep learning new things. Be part of something bigger. Have goals to look forward to. They may sound fairly like being in favour of motherhood and apple pie, yet, despite sounding platitudinous, they are certainly likely to make people more balanced and positive, and significantly less likely to suffer bouts of depression.
Here’s the catch, however.
They are not the kind of values promoted within the average bank or fund management firm.
If anything, the financial markets do precisely the opposite of what is likely to make people happy.
They concentrate on paying out huge cash bonuses, usually tied to demanding performance criteria, even though there is very little evidence to suggest that beyond a certain minimum level having more money actually makes people any happier.
They promote a ruthless competition between staff, and between companies, constantly benchmarking their performance against their peers. In fund management, for example, you have failed if you haven’t managed to beat the guy doing the same job at the next fund, even though you may have made plenty of money for your investors. And yet that is only likely to make their staff feel anxious and insecure.
And they promote a relentless short-termism, continually shortening the time to come up with results, even though it is usually far better to concentrate on medium-term performance, and more satisfying for the staff as well.
In short, if they were deliberately setting out to make their traders and stock-pickers depressed, it is hard to see how they could be doing a better job.
But, of course, the more depressed their staff are, the worse they will be at their jobs. In fact, it is a classic Catch-22. To trade well, you have to be happy, but everything about the work is likely to make you depressed, so you’ll end up being a very bad trader – the kind of person who thinks North Korea will win the World Cup, or that oil will be trading back at $20 a barrel by the end of next year.
Is there a way out of that? Perhaps.
Maybe investors should stop looking at all those charts that banks and fund managers love to produce showing how they out-performed their peers over the last there months. And maybe they should stop listening to all those boastful adverts about how the pay of staff is linked to performance.
Instead, just ask if the traders and stock-pickers are cheerful, feeling good about themselves, and are well looked after. Who knows, over the medium-term it might even produce better results.
What makes a successful trader or fund manager? An all-encompassing view of how the global economy is developing? An instinct for a bargain? A fleetness of foot, and the confidence to take bold positions? A willingness to ignore the herd, and buy the stuff everyone else is selling? Or the patience and perseverance of a tortoise?
They are all perfectly reasonable suggestions, and there are many great traders and investors who have made fortunes through one or other of qualities.
But actually the answer may be a lot simpler.
Just try being a bit happier.
According to research released this month by the French business school Insead, the happier people are, the better they are at predicting the future – and the more depressed they are, the worse they are.
The implication is clear, both for banks and fund managers. Just make sure your traders and stock-pickers are cheerful and positive, and their performance will improve. The trouble is, however, they are caught in a classic Catch-22. Everything about the way most people in the financial markets work is guaranteed to make them miserable – and therefore to make them worse at their jobs.
The Insead research provided a fascinating insight into what makes people good at predicting future events – and what makes them bad at it as well. It has long been noted that more cheerful people tend to have a more optimistic view of the future, whilst the more miserable, not very surprisingly, are usually more pessimistic. In the markets, the optimists are usually bulls, while the pessimists are bears.
The Insead study went a lot deeper than that. It took 1,100 people, and asked them to predict the results of games during the 2010 World Cup. They weren’t particularly being optimistic or pessimistic – they weren’t making predictions for their own nations - they were just forecasting what was likely to happen. As an incentive to try and get it right, there was a cash prize for getting it right.
Interestingly, the more depressed the people were, the less likely they were to make accurate predictions. Indeed, many of the most down in the dumps did worse than they would have done just by picking winners from a hat. And they were significantly more likely to make ridiculous predictions, such as forecasting that North Korea would win the whole tournament.
The Insead team is now taking the same methods, and applying then directly to the emotional states of stock and commodity traders. But the implications are already clear enough. If being happy or depressed has a bearing on your ability to forecast the outcome of events, then it follows that happier fund managers or traders will be better at their jobs than their more morose colleagues.
The snag is, how do you influence the happiness of your staff?
Well, in truth, it isn’t that hard.
We have a fairly good understanding of what makes people feel good about life, and what make them depressed. Most of the key points were summarised by the ‘Action for Happiness’ campaign launched earlier this month by Professor Richard Layard, the guru of happiness economics, among others.
Happiness, it turns out, comes down to a few fairly simple things. Do things for other people. Take care of your body. Notice the world around you. Keep learning new things. Be part of something bigger. Have goals to look forward to. They may sound fairly like being in favour of motherhood and apple pie, yet, despite sounding platitudinous, they are certainly likely to make people more balanced and positive, and significantly less likely to suffer bouts of depression.
Here’s the catch, however.
They are not the kind of values promoted within the average bank or fund management firm.
If anything, the financial markets do precisely the opposite of what is likely to make people happy.
They concentrate on paying out huge cash bonuses, usually tied to demanding performance criteria, even though there is very little evidence to suggest that beyond a certain minimum level having more money actually makes people any happier.
They promote a ruthless competition between staff, and between companies, constantly benchmarking their performance against their peers. In fund management, for example, you have failed if you haven’t managed to beat the guy doing the same job at the next fund, even though you may have made plenty of money for your investors. And yet that is only likely to make their staff feel anxious and insecure.
And they promote a relentless short-termism, continually shortening the time to come up with results, even though it is usually far better to concentrate on medium-term performance, and more satisfying for the staff as well.
In short, if they were deliberately setting out to make their traders and stock-pickers depressed, it is hard to see how they could be doing a better job.
But, of course, the more depressed their staff are, the worse they will be at their jobs. In fact, it is a classic Catch-22. To trade well, you have to be happy, but everything about the work is likely to make you depressed, so you’ll end up being a very bad trader – the kind of person who thinks North Korea will win the World Cup, or that oil will be trading back at $20 a barrel by the end of next year.
Is there a way out of that? Perhaps.
Maybe investors should stop looking at all those charts that banks and fund managers love to produce showing how they out-performed their peers over the last there months. And maybe they should stop listening to all those boastful adverts about how the pay of staff is linked to performance.
Instead, just ask if the traders and stock-pickers are cheerful, feeling good about themselves, and are well looked after. Who knows, over the medium-term it might even produce better results.
Monday, 18 April 2011
Great Review Of Shadow Force...from Aus.
There is a great review of Shadow Force from ABC Brisbane in Australia. "It's loud, it's fast and it's extremely aggressive.....Action, adventure and lots of guns combined with an excellent political sub-plot. For teenage boys or simply for those men who don't want to grow up, Shadow Force is a cracking read. Intellectually stimulating it ain't; fantastic fun it most certainly is."
You can read the whole thing here.
You can read the whole thing here.
How Much Research Is Enough?
Over at the International Thriller Writers site, I'm taking part in a round table on how much research is enough. Here's what I had to say - but take a look at the rest of the discussion.
I think research is one of those things where it helps to have experience. As CE Lawrence quite rightly points out, it is easy for the research to show too much on the page. A writer needs to know their subject, and to have a real feel for it. They need to know their characters as well, and have a real feel for the kinds of things they would think and feel and say as well. But they don’t have to have a text-book knowledge of everything they are writing about.
I suspect that attitudes to research have changed over the years as well. When I was writing ‘Fire Force’, which is a book set amongst mercenaries in Africa, I went back and re-read some of the classics of the genre. For example, I re-read ‘The Dogs of War’ by Frederick Forsyth. I can remember reading it when it came out, when I would have been about ten, and loving it. But today it seems like a really dull book, mainly because there is just too much research in it. The hero spends ages and ages setting up the mission. He regularly travels to Brussels to set up false bank accounts – by train and ferry, for Heaven’s sake, which takes up many pages. He doesn’t even get a plane. In the end, it just makes for what today seems a really dull read.
By contrast, ‘The Da Vinci Code’ is a poorly researched book. There are plenty or mistakes. Indeed, Westminster Abbey in London even had to issue a guidebook for tourists correcting some of the factual errors because so many tourists came in asking about them. But who cares? It’s a really good book – and it certainly sold well.
Thirty years ago, I think people expected thrillers to be very research-driven. But not right now. Today the key is to create your characters, and your story, and then do the research that is necessary to get things right. But this is fiction – its the plot and the people that really count.
I think research is one of those things where it helps to have experience. As CE Lawrence quite rightly points out, it is easy for the research to show too much on the page. A writer needs to know their subject, and to have a real feel for it. They need to know their characters as well, and have a real feel for the kinds of things they would think and feel and say as well. But they don’t have to have a text-book knowledge of everything they are writing about.
I suspect that attitudes to research have changed over the years as well. When I was writing ‘Fire Force’, which is a book set amongst mercenaries in Africa, I went back and re-read some of the classics of the genre. For example, I re-read ‘The Dogs of War’ by Frederick Forsyth. I can remember reading it when it came out, when I would have been about ten, and loving it. But today it seems like a really dull book, mainly because there is just too much research in it. The hero spends ages and ages setting up the mission. He regularly travels to Brussels to set up false bank accounts – by train and ferry, for Heaven’s sake, which takes up many pages. He doesn’t even get a plane. In the end, it just makes for what today seems a really dull read.
By contrast, ‘The Da Vinci Code’ is a poorly researched book. There are plenty or mistakes. Indeed, Westminster Abbey in London even had to issue a guidebook for tourists correcting some of the factual errors because so many tourists came in asking about them. But who cares? It’s a really good book – and it certainly sold well.
Thirty years ago, I think people expected thrillers to be very research-driven. But not right now. Today the key is to create your characters, and your story, and then do the research that is necessary to get things right. But this is fiction – its the plot and the people that really count.
Sunday, 17 April 2011
Bust is Shortlisted for Best Business Book....
I'm getting a lot of awards right now. 'Bust' has just been short-listed for the Spear's Book Awards Business Book of the Year award. The results are announced in June. Fingers crossed.
SABEW Award
My Bloomberg column has been awarded a prize for best opinion writer by the Society of American Business Writers and Editors.
The Vickers Whitewash....
In this week's Money Week column, I've been looking at the Vickers Report, and how it let the banks off the hook. Here's a taster....
This year, the UK had a Goldilocks moment to get to grips with its over-mighty finance industry. Two years ago, the banks were still too weak. You can’t put a patient in for major heart surgery when they are still recovering from a car crash. In the immediate wake of the credit crunch, the banks could not have survived radical restructuring. And in another two years, the banks will all be making big profits again, paying lots of corporation tax, and paying big donations to political parties. The memory of the credit crunch will have faded, and the political will to break then up will have evaporated.
But right now, the banks are strong enough to take some punishment. And the desire to make sure the events of 2008 are never repeated is still there. As Goldilocks would put it, it is neither too hot nor too cold – but just right.
Despite that, Sir John Vickers and his colleagues on the Independent Banking Commission blew it. Last Monday’s report on the future of the British financial services industry was the dampest possible squib. Its response was so feeble, and so irrelevant, that it now looks the British banks have in effect escaped from the worst series of collapses in a century or more without any meaningful reform to the way they operate.
No one can be in much doubt that Britain’s banking industry is in need of a major structural overhaul. Put simply, this country’s banks have become too big, and too risky, for the size of the economy that ultimately underpins them.
The point was well illustrated in a research note published by UBS last month. Barclays now has a balance sheet worth 100% of GDP. For a comparison, JP Morgan has a balance sheet worth 24% of US GDP. In effect, Britain is host to three very large banks – Barclays, HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland – each of which has the potential to quite literally bankrupt the country.
We have already seen how Iceland and Ireland were ruined by the recklessness of their financiers. The same could easily happen to this country. It is a threat, and one the Commission had a duty to take seriously.
And yet, probably under the influence of lobbying from the banking industry, it has largely ignored it. The report singles out Lloyds for its main attention – when, in fact, it is the bank that poses the least threat to the stability of the financial system.
Lloyds will be forced to sell off more branches, over and above the 600 the EU is already making it get rid of. It is certainly true that Gordon Brown’s decision to bounced Lloyds into merging with HBOS was one of the former Prime Minister’s many catastrophic mistakes. It ruined a fairly sound bank, and dramatically reduced the competition in the mortgage and savings market. If reducing its size creates some space for new players in the financial services industry that will certainly be a good thing.
Yet, it is crazy to imagine that will make the financial system more stable. There is simply no evidence to suggest that too little competition between the banks is what led up to the credit crunch. Indeed, through 2006 and 2007 there were arguably too many lenders crowding into the British market. They were throwing around self-cert buy-to-let mortgages like confetti. More competition in a market is always a good thing. It creates more choice, and better service, with better prices. But anyone who thinks it is going to make the system safer is simply kidding themselves.
If the Commission was too harsh on Lloyds, it was too soft on RBS, Barclays and HSBC. It proposes stricter capital requirements, and dividing lines between the retail and investment banking units, so that the investment bank can safely be allowed to go bust, whilst the retail arm will be protected.
The trouble is, neither is going to fix the real issues.
The banks didn’t go bust because they had too little capital. A bigger buffer against financial shocks will help, but a reckless bonus system, too many complex products, and mindless expansion into markets they didn’t understand were the underlying causes of the crisis. Would RBS have survived with a couple of percent more capital? Almost certainly not. Neither would any of the other banks.
Nor is ‘ring-fencing’ the banks retails arms going to make a great deal of difference. It is very hard to believe that any kind of structure can be created that will make it certain that a collapse of the investment banking arm won’t bring down the retail bank as well. Bankers are very good at shifting money around a balance sheet. If there is a way of making the retail unit subsidise the rest of the bank, someone will find it and exploit it. For the system to work, you have to believe that the regulators are smarter and more knowledgeable than the people working in the banks – and the chances of that are just about zero.
Vickers had a one-off chance to do something really radical. He should have proposed a complete split between retail and investment banking. The retail banks would be safe, fairly dull institutions, and they could be fully protected by the government from failure. . The investment banks could take all the risks they liked, in much the same way that the hedge funds do, and if they went bust it wouldn’t matter very much to anyone apart from their staff.
Barclays might opt to move to New York. HSBC might decide to go back to Hong Kong, or to Shanghai. But so what? It matters much less than most people suppose whether a bank is domiciled in this country. The Commission had a duty to think seriously about whether it was responsible to host massive banks in the UK. It failed completely. The moment to protect the country from another massive banking collapse has passed – it won’t come again.
This year, the UK had a Goldilocks moment to get to grips with its over-mighty finance industry. Two years ago, the banks were still too weak. You can’t put a patient in for major heart surgery when they are still recovering from a car crash. In the immediate wake of the credit crunch, the banks could not have survived radical restructuring. And in another two years, the banks will all be making big profits again, paying lots of corporation tax, and paying big donations to political parties. The memory of the credit crunch will have faded, and the political will to break then up will have evaporated.
But right now, the banks are strong enough to take some punishment. And the desire to make sure the events of 2008 are never repeated is still there. As Goldilocks would put it, it is neither too hot nor too cold – but just right.
Despite that, Sir John Vickers and his colleagues on the Independent Banking Commission blew it. Last Monday’s report on the future of the British financial services industry was the dampest possible squib. Its response was so feeble, and so irrelevant, that it now looks the British banks have in effect escaped from the worst series of collapses in a century or more without any meaningful reform to the way they operate.
No one can be in much doubt that Britain’s banking industry is in need of a major structural overhaul. Put simply, this country’s banks have become too big, and too risky, for the size of the economy that ultimately underpins them.
The point was well illustrated in a research note published by UBS last month. Barclays now has a balance sheet worth 100% of GDP. For a comparison, JP Morgan has a balance sheet worth 24% of US GDP. In effect, Britain is host to three very large banks – Barclays, HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland – each of which has the potential to quite literally bankrupt the country.
We have already seen how Iceland and Ireland were ruined by the recklessness of their financiers. The same could easily happen to this country. It is a threat, and one the Commission had a duty to take seriously.
And yet, probably under the influence of lobbying from the banking industry, it has largely ignored it. The report singles out Lloyds for its main attention – when, in fact, it is the bank that poses the least threat to the stability of the financial system.
Lloyds will be forced to sell off more branches, over and above the 600 the EU is already making it get rid of. It is certainly true that Gordon Brown’s decision to bounced Lloyds into merging with HBOS was one of the former Prime Minister’s many catastrophic mistakes. It ruined a fairly sound bank, and dramatically reduced the competition in the mortgage and savings market. If reducing its size creates some space for new players in the financial services industry that will certainly be a good thing.
Yet, it is crazy to imagine that will make the financial system more stable. There is simply no evidence to suggest that too little competition between the banks is what led up to the credit crunch. Indeed, through 2006 and 2007 there were arguably too many lenders crowding into the British market. They were throwing around self-cert buy-to-let mortgages like confetti. More competition in a market is always a good thing. It creates more choice, and better service, with better prices. But anyone who thinks it is going to make the system safer is simply kidding themselves.
If the Commission was too harsh on Lloyds, it was too soft on RBS, Barclays and HSBC. It proposes stricter capital requirements, and dividing lines between the retail and investment banking units, so that the investment bank can safely be allowed to go bust, whilst the retail arm will be protected.
The trouble is, neither is going to fix the real issues.
The banks didn’t go bust because they had too little capital. A bigger buffer against financial shocks will help, but a reckless bonus system, too many complex products, and mindless expansion into markets they didn’t understand were the underlying causes of the crisis. Would RBS have survived with a couple of percent more capital? Almost certainly not. Neither would any of the other banks.
Nor is ‘ring-fencing’ the banks retails arms going to make a great deal of difference. It is very hard to believe that any kind of structure can be created that will make it certain that a collapse of the investment banking arm won’t bring down the retail bank as well. Bankers are very good at shifting money around a balance sheet. If there is a way of making the retail unit subsidise the rest of the bank, someone will find it and exploit it. For the system to work, you have to believe that the regulators are smarter and more knowledgeable than the people working in the banks – and the chances of that are just about zero.
Vickers had a one-off chance to do something really radical. He should have proposed a complete split between retail and investment banking. The retail banks would be safe, fairly dull institutions, and they could be fully protected by the government from failure. . The investment banks could take all the risks they liked, in much the same way that the hedge funds do, and if they went bust it wouldn’t matter very much to anyone apart from their staff.
Barclays might opt to move to New York. HSBC might decide to go back to Hong Kong, or to Shanghai. But so what? It matters much less than most people suppose whether a bank is domiciled in this country. The Commission had a duty to think seriously about whether it was responsible to host massive banks in the UK. It failed completely. The moment to protect the country from another massive banking collapse has passed – it won’t come again.
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